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To (B) OR NOT To (B):
THE FUTURE OF AIDER AND ABETTOR
LIABILITY IN SOUTH CAROLINA*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Liability for another's wrongdoing is not a new concept to the law.' The
Bible recognized that it was wrong to help another commit wrong,2 and this
principle appeared in English law as early as the seventeenth century.'
Eventually the principle came into this country as the doctrine of vicarious
liability for concerted action. Extended somewhat, the principle now includes
liability for aiding and abetting another's tortious conduct.5
Aiding and abetting a tort has been a viable cause of action in American
courts since at least 1850,6 and the legislature codified aiding and abetting as
*. This Note originally appeared in Book 2, Volume 51 of the SouTH CAROLINA LAW
REVIEW.

1. See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 350, ch. 321, § 322,35 Stat. 1088, 1150 (imposing
liability as a principal on those who aid and abet trespass and robbery); Central Bank ofDenver
v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 181 (1994) (stating "[a]iding and abetting is
an ancient criminal law doctrine"); Sir John Heydon's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 1150, 1151 (K.B.
1613) (imposing joint liability on all who come together to commit the trespass of battery).
2. See Proverbs 1:10-19.
3. See Clark v. Newsam, 154 Eng. Rep. 55, 57, 59 (Ex. 1847) (recognizing joint liability
for false imprisonment where only one of two defendants signed a charge-sheet); Matthews v.
Coal, 79 Eng. Rep. 329, 329 (Ex. Ch. 1616) (affirming a joint damage award against three
defendants found guilty of one battery). These early cases are not aiding and abetting cases, but
rather are based on the concerted action theory found in the Restatement of Torts. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(a) (1979).
4. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 46, at 322

(5th ed. 1984); see also Brown v. Perkins, 83 Mass. (1 Allen) 89, 98 (1861) (holding that
defendants could be held liable as principals for aiding and abetting by their presence at the
trespass and encouragement and excitement of the wrongful conduct).
5. See KEETON ET AL., supranote 4, at 323 & n.7.

6. See Bird v. Lynn, 49 Ky. (10 B. Mon.) 422,423 (1850) (stating that a claim for an aiding
and abetting trespass, assault and battery would lie where defendant's words encouraged the
principal's conduct and the words were directly related to the conduct); see also Perkins, 83
Mass. (1 Allen), at 98:
[A]ny person who is present at the commission of a trespass,
encouraging or exciting the same by words, gestures, looks, or
signs, or who in any way or by any means countenances or
approves the same, is in law deemed to be an aider and abettor,
and liable as principal.
Id.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts summarizes the elements ofcommonlaw aiding and abetting
liability. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979). That section provides:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of
another, one is subject to liability if he (a) does a tortious act in
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a criminal offense as early as 1909.' Unfortunately, a long history does not
necessarily provide a clear history.' The Supreme Court has noted that the
doctrine surfaces most often in statutory securities cases, and its application has
been uncertain, based largely on limited common law precedent.9
South Carolina finds aiding and abetting in its common law as well, 0 but
its application has been similarly limited." However, this history does not
suggest that aiding and abetting is not viable in South Carolina; to the
2 contrary,
"[a]ider and abettor liability is alive and well in South Carolina."'
This Comment explores common law aiding and abetting liability, paying
particular attention to its past and future effects on South Carolina law. Part II
examines the limited history of South Carolina's aiding and abetting liability

concert with the other or pursuant to a common design with him,
or (b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of
duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the
other so to conduct himself, or (c)
gives substantial assistance to
the other in accomplishing a tortious result and his own conduct,
separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third
person.
Id.
7. See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 350, ch.321, § 322, 35 Stat. 1088, 1150; Central

Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
8. See KEETONETAL., supra note 4, at 322 ("An examination of the multitude of cases in
which [theories ofjoint tort and joint tortfeasors] ... are to be found leads to the conclusion that
[these theories] ... have meant very different things to different courts, and often to the same
court ....).

9. CentralBank, 511 U.S. at 181 (referencing Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472,489
(D.C. Cir. 1983)). The evolution of aiding and abetting liability under section 876(b) of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts is interesting. When the federal courts began adopting elements
foraiding and abetting securities law violations, aiding and abetting was hardly awell-developed
doctrine at common law. See CentralBank, 511 U.S. at 181. The federal courts used section
876(b)'s requirements for almost 20 years before deciding, in CentralBank, that no private
aiding and abetting cause of action existed under the statute. See id. at 19 1.Now state courts are
left to struggle with section 876(b) using statutory interpretations loosely based on an underdeveloped common law doctrine.
10. See Atlanta Skin & Cancer Clinic v. Hallmark Gen. Partners, Inc., No. 91-CP-23-3958,
slip op. at 6 (S.C. Ct. of Common Pleas Feb. 24, 1994) ("South Carolina has long recognized
aider and abettor liability."), rev'd inpart,affd inpart,320 S.C. 113, 121,463 S.E.2d 600, 605
(1995) (holding no implied cause of action for aiding and abetting securities statute exists except
for the remedy provided by § 35-1-1500 of the South Carolina Code and stating that the court
did not submit the case to the jury on common law aiding and abetting theory); see also
Singleton v. Hughes, 245 S.C. 169, 139 S.E.2d 747 (1965) (recognizing that passenger injured
in automobile wreck would bebarred from recovery by contributory negligence ifjury found that
automobile was involved in a race at the time of the accident because passengers in racing
automobiles are liable for injuries resulting therefrom).
11. SeeAtlanta Skin & CancerClinic,No. 91-CP-23-3958, slip op. at 8 ("[O]ur court has
held in at least three cases that aiding and abetting liability exists for negligence, breach of
fiduciary duty, and abuse of process."). Since then, only one other case involving aiding and
abetting a tort has been reported in South Carolina. See Future Group, Il v. Nationsbank, 324
S.C. 89,478 S.E.2d 45 (1996).
12. John Freeman, The Lying Client, S. C. LAW., Nov.-Dec. 1998, at 10.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol51/iss4/21

2

Willis: To (B) Or Not to (B): The Future of Aider And Abettor Liability i
TORT LAW
1047

2000

doctrine to elucidate where the state stands today. Part III looks at how the
Restatement's 3 formulation of the aider and abettor liability doctrine has fared
in other jurisdictions, and discusses some of the policy arguments surrounding
interpretation of the elements of the tort. Part IV suggests a path that South
Carolina should follow as the courts begin to establish a more complete
precedent in this area and examines some new uses for this old form of
liability.
II. AiDER AND ABETTOR LIABILITY IN SOUTH CAROLINA
A. Pruitt v. Bowers
In April of 1998, the South Carolina Court of Appeals, recognizing that
this state had not yet substantially addressed liability for aiders and abettors
under Restatement (Second) of Torts section 876(b) 14 remanded Pruitt v.
Bowers 5 for the trial court to consider whether South Carolina should accept
the Restatement's version of aider and abettor liability.16
Pruitt arose out of an automobile accident in which Ms. Pruitt suffered
injuries when an intoxicated Mr. Bowers, driving thirty miles an hour over the
speed limit, ran a red light and struck Pruitt's car.'7 There were two passengers
in Bowers's car, Mr. Poore and Mr. Werts.'8 Poore and Bowers smoked
19
marijuana earlier in the day and later all three went to a lake to drink beer.
Bowers drove, and Poore and Werts offered to pay for gas.20 While at the lake,
Bowers drank twelve beers in one-and-a-half'hours andbecame too intoxicated
to drive-a fact which Poore knew.2' Initially, on the trip home, Werts drove
Bowers's car at Poore's and Bowers's request.' However, at some point
Bowers began driving because Werts was not driving well.' While Bowers
drove, Poore slept in the back seat and was still asleep at the time of the
accident. 2'
Pruitt sued all three men. The trial court granted Poore's motion for
summary judgment on the claim ofjoint enterprise liability.25 At the same time,
however, the judge granted Pruitt's motion to amend her complaint to include

13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979).

14.
15.
16.
17.

See id.
330 S.C. 483,488-89,499 S.E.2d 250, 253 (Ct. App. 1998).
Id.
Id. at 486, 499 S.E.2d at 252.

18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 485, 499 S.E.2d at 251.
Id. at 485, 499 S.E.2d at 252.
Id. at 485,499 S.E.2d at 251.
Id. at 485, 499 S.E.2d at 252.

22. Id.
23. Id. at 486, 499 S.E.2d at 252.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 485, 499 S.E.2d at 251.
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causes of action under 876(b) and civil conspiracy.26 The court of appeals
affirmed the trial court on both counts and remanded the case for consideration
of the amended complaint.27
Discussing Pruitt's motion to amend her complaint, the court stated that it
"elect[ed] not to entertain Poore's appeal because of the novelty of the theory
of liability" in 876(b). 28 Presumably, the court of appeals believed that South
Carolina courts had not yet addressed 876(b) thoroughly enough to qualify as
precedent.
B. A PassingGlance: The Court'sFirstLook at Section 876(b)
Section 876(b) did appear in one South Carolina case before Pruitt.The
supreme court addressed an 876(b) claim in FutureGroup,ifv. Nationsbank9
but ruled against the plaintiff on that cause of action." In FutureGroup if, a
preferred shareholder and a creditor suedNationsbank, claiming that the bank's
refinancing ofcorporate debt aided and abetted the corporate director's breach
of fiduciary duty.3 ' The refinancing was a breach of the director's fiduciary
duty because the refinancing constituted a "corporate guarantee of a director's
debt" without shareholder or creditor approval as required by the by-laws and
by the credit agreement.32
The court relied on 876(b) as well as aiding and abetting cases from other
jurisdictions to find that the bank was not liable for aiding and abetting the
director's breach 3 The court stated the elements of the claim to be: "(1) a
breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the plaintiff (2) the defendant's knowing
' Relying heavily on the
participation in the breach and (3) damages."34
requirement of "the defendant's knowing participation in the [fiduciary's]
breach, '35 the court found that the bank did not have actual knowledge that the
refinancing required shareholder approval.3 6 Although the actual knowledge
requirement appeared in Future Group if, it is not entirely clear that the court
would require strict actual knowledge in all cases. Implying that something less
may suffice, the court noted that the transaction met the statutory requirement
of either majority approval by the shareholders or approval by the board of

26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 488, 499 S.E.2d at 253.
29. 324 S.C. 89, 100, 478 S.E.2d 45, 50 (1996).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 95, 478 S.E.2d at 48.
32. Id. at 98-99, 478 S.E.2d at 50.
33. Id. at 99,478 S.E.2d at 50 (citing Samuel M. Feinberg Testamentary Trust v. Carter,
652 F. Supp. 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Holmes v. Young, 885 P.2d 305 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988);
Spinner v. Nutt, 631 N.E.2d 542 (Mass. 1994); Blow v. Shaughnessy, 364 S.E.2d 444 (N.C.

1988)).
34. Future Group,11,324 S.C. at 99, 478 S.E.2d at 50 (citing Holmes, 885 P.2d at 308-09).

35. Id.
36. Id.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol51/iss4/21
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directors.37 Since the refinancing satisfied this requirement, it was not possible
to infer that the38bank knew that the transaction was in breach of the director's
fiduciary duty.
C. Section 876(b) Alternatives: South Carolina'sExperience With Other
Civil Aider andAbettor Liability
Although section 876(b), in particular, has not been adequately addressed,
South Carolina is not without a history of imposing liability for aiding and
abetting the wrongful act of another. However, the situation is not unlike the
one lamented by the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia when it noted
that "[p]recedent, except in the securities area, is largely confined to isolated
acts of adolescents in rural society."39 Two early cases, Singleton v. Hughes'°
and Skipper v. Hartley,41 fall into this category.
In Skipper the South Carolina Supreme Court addressed for the first time
whether a defendant passenger in vehicle A that was racing against vehicle B
could be held liable for injuries caused to a third party passenger in vehicle C,
which was not racing.42 The court affirmed judgment against the defendant
passenger, finding that "[a]l1 who wilfully participate in speed competition
between motor vehicles on a public highway are jointly and concurrently
negligent and, if damage to one not involved in the race proximately results
from it, all participants are liable, regardless of which of the racing cars actually
inflicts the injury."
Two years later, the court recognized this concept of aider and abettor
liability when it applied the rule used in Skipper to slightly different facts." In
Singleton, the plaintiff was the administrator of the deceased passenger's
estate."' The defendant driver argued that the doctrine of contributory
recklessness barred recovery by the plaintiff because the deceased passenger
was "participating, aiding and abetting in an automobile race." 46 Accepting this
statement of the law, the court nevertheless upheld the jury verdict for the

37. Id.
38. Id. The board of directors had in fact signed a corporate resolution stating that the
transaction was in the best interests of the corporation. Id. at98, 478 S.E.2d at 50. South Carolina
has yet to create a definitive standard for aider and abettor liability under 876(b). Parts III and
IV of this Comment examine the scienter requirement.
39. Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472,489 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
40. 245 S.C. 169, 171, 139 S.E.2d 747, 748 (1965).
41. 242 S.C. 221,222-23, 130 S.E.2d 486,487 (1963).
42. Id. at 224, 130 S.E.2d at488.
43. Id. at 226, 130 S.E.2d 488-89 (quoting Boykin v. Bennett, 118 S.E.2d 12, 17 (N.C.
1961)).
44. See Singleton, 245 S.C. at 171, 139 S.E.2d at 748.
45. Id.
46. Id.
Published by Scholar Commons, 2000
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plaintiffbecause the plaintiffpresented sufficient evidence to establish that the
race had ended by the time of the accident. 47
Later, South Carolina extended aider and abettor liability beyond these
limited racing situations and recognized a cause of action for aiding and
abetting a breach of fiduciary duty and abuse of process. InLowndes Products,
Inc. v. Brower,4 the South Carolina Supreme Court found the defendants liable
for assisting the financing of a new company started by the plaintiff's former
employees. According to the court, the defendants were liable for aiding and
abetting the employees' breach of fiduciary duty to their former employer.49 In
so finding, the court stated that "a person who without privilege knowingly
causes an agent to abandon his duties, or otherwise aids or assists him to violate
a duty to his principal is subject to tort liability to the principal."50 While this
language relates to duties between principals and agents, the court went on to
apply a test strikingly similar to section 876(b). 5' Applying the test, the court
found that a breach by the employees injured the plaintiff, the defendants
knowingly cooperated with the employees, and the defendants helped to further
the employees' disloyalty. 2
The supreme court used an aiding and abetting theory again a few years
later to hold a defendant liable for aiding and abetting abuse of process in
BroadmoorApartmentsof Charlestonv. Horwitz.53 The court stated that "[a]s
a general rule, liability for an abuse of process extends to all who knowingly
participate, aid, or abet in the abuse."' In that case, aiding and abetting liability
attached when defendant Schlopy helped a third party file a lis pendens notice
despite knowing that the third party's asserted rights were not valid.5"
Additionally, Schlopy filed a supporting affidavit containing statements he
knew to be untrue.56
As illustrated by case law, aiding and abetting liability for common law
torts is not without precedent in South Carolina, but the state law in this area
is far from settled. Having not yet explicitly adopted 876(b), the courts of the
state stand at a point where they can choose their course. Obviously, aider and
abettor liability has the potential to be incredibly broad-punishing unwary,

47. Id. at 178, 139 S.E.2d at 752.

48. 259 S.C. 322, 191 S.E.2d 761 (1972).
49. Id. at 337-38, 191 S.E.2d at 769-70.
50. Id. at 337, 191 S.E.2d at 769 (quoting 3 AM. JuR. 2DAgency § 290 (1994)).
51. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 876(b) (1979) (stating that one is liable if he

"knows that another's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or
encouragement to the other so to conduct himself...").
52. Lowndes, 259 S.C. at 337, 191 S.E.2d at 769.

53. 306 S.C. 482, 413 S.E.2d 9 (1991).
54. Id. at 486, 413 S.E.2d at 11 (citing I AM. JUR. 2DAbuse of Process § 17 (1994); 72
C.J.S. Process § 112 (1987)).
55. Id. at 487, 413 S.E.2d at 12.
56. Id.
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faultless parties57 and thereby making it difficult for small businesses to get
professional advice. 8 At the same time, properly construed and applied, an
aider and abettor cause of action can be very useful-giving plaintiffs
something closer to full compensation, deterring parties from getting involved
on the fringes of wrongful activity, and punishing accomplices who bury their
head in the sand to avoid seeing the wrongful conduct. 9 These policy
arguments are explored further in Part IV of this Comment after a more
complete discussion of how other jurisdictions have addressed Restatement
section 876(b).
I. SECTION 876(b): AN ELEMENTAL ANALYSIS
A. A Word of Caution

If South Carolina is to embrace 876(b) and allow qualified plaintiffs to
recover from aiders and abettors, a few issues need to be addressed so that the
courts do not find themselves muddled in confusing authority from other
jurisdictions. 6' By addressing these issues, South Carolina can find a workable
standard in the beginning and avoid uncertainty and backtracking in the future.
The first issue involves the difference between "(1) conspiracy, or
concertedaction by agreement[discussed in 876(a)], and (2) aiding-abetting,
or concerted action by substantial assistance [found in 876(b)]." 61 The

potential exists for courts to blur these two distinct subsections into one big
mess.6 The differences are important to maintain where both subsections could
apply so that the court can determine whether the plaintiff has established one
cause of action, instead of parts of each but not a whole of either.63
B. Requirementsfor an 876(b) Cause ofAction

57. See William H. Kuehnle, Secondary Liability Under the Federal Securities
Laws-Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, Controlling Person, and Agency: Common-Law
Principlesand the Statutory Scheme, 14 J.CORP. L. 313, 324 (1988); Stanley Pietrusiak, Jr.,
Comment, Changingthe Natureof CorporateRepresentation: Attorney LiabilityforAidingand
Abetting the Breach of FiduciaryDuty, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J. 213,238 (1996).
58. See Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 189
(1994) (noting the ripple effects that excessive aider and abettor liability may have).
59. See id. at 188.
60. See id. at 181 (stating that aiding and abetting doctrine under 876(b) has had uncertain
application).
61. Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1983). But see Granewich v.
Harding, 985 P.2d 788, 792 (Or. 1999) (stating that conspiracy and aiding and abetting are not
separate theories ofrecovery but instead are "two of several ways in which a person may become
jointly liable for another's tortious conduct").
62. See Halberstam,705 F.2d at 478.
63. See id.
Published by Scholar Commons, 2000
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The Restatementidentifies the elements of a cause of action for aiding and
abetting a tort, but it is vague as to exactly how those elements apply in a real
case. The Restatement states that "[fior harm resulting to a third person from
the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he... (b) knows
that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial
assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself.""
Section 876(b) has frequently been broken down into the following
requirements: (1) a wrongful act by the primary tortfeasor that results in injury
to the plaintiff, (2) defendant's knowledge of the wrongful act, and (3)
defendant's substantial assistance to the primary violator in the commission of
the wrongful act.65 Aiding and abetting liability, when established by these
three elements, holds a defendant liable for all of the foreseeable consequences
of the assisted conduct.6
The following sections address some of the issues that arise in defining the
latter two requirements-requirements which have given courts the most
trouble over the years.67 Some courts analyze these two elements separately;
others treat them as interrelated. 68
1. Defendant'sKnowledge ofBreach by Primary Wrongdoer
The Restatement summarizes that the defendant must know that the
primary wrongdoer has breached a duty, but it does not make clear whether
actual or constructive knowledge will suffice. 69 As a result, courts applying the

64. RmrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979).
65. See Halberstam,705 F.2d at 477; Holmes v. Young, 885 P.2d 305, 308-09 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1994); Blow v. Shaughnessy, 364 S.E.2d 444, 447 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (adopting
requirements from federal securities actions); Patrick J.McNulty & Daniel J.Hanson, Liability
for Aiding andAbettingby Silence orInaction:An UnfoundedDoctrine,29 TORT&INs. L.J. 14,
18 (1993).
66. See Halberstam,705 F.2d at 488; American Family Mutual Ins. Co. v. Grim, 440 P.2d
621,625 (Kan. 1968) (finding that a boy who aided and abetted others in breaking into a church
to steal drinks to also be liable for the foreseeable fire damage caused when one of the torches
used by the others to see while inside the church accidentally set fire to the attic, even though
the defendant had not been in the attic or used a torch); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS § 876,
cmt. d, illus. 10 (1979) (stating that one who aids and abets a burglary may also be liable where
the primary wrongdoers sets fire to the scene to conceal the offense). However, the liability for
foreseeable conduct is limited to liability for those acts done that are related to the assisted act.
For example, an aider and abettor liable for assisting another's trespass is not liable for damages
caused when the primary wrongdoer also intentionally sets fire to the landowner's house. See
id. at illus. 11.
67. See, e.g., Kuehnle, supranote 57, at 322 (arguing knowledge is the most controversial
requirement); McNulty & Hanson, supra note 65, at 19 (1993) (noting assistance is the key
element).
68. See Witzman v. Lehrman, Lehrman, & Flom, 601 N.W.2d 179, 188 (Minn. 1999)
(recognizing that the knowledge and assistance elements are interrelated); Future Group, II v.
Nationsbank, 324 S.C. 89, 100, 478 S.E.2d 45, 50 (treating elements separately).
69. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979).
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Restatement have used both standards.7" Constructive knowledge, as used in
this Comment, means that the defendant has either acted recklessly in not
knowing of the breach or that the circumstances warrant an inference that he
knew of the breach.7' Circumstantial evidence may provide the necessary proof
to infer the defendant's knowledge.7"
Courts addressing the knowledge requirement independent of 876(b) have
often been hesitant to specifically define the knowledge element. 73 The United
States Supreme Court has suggested that 876(b) is analogous to criminal aiding
and abetting.74 Some lower courts have interpreted this statement to require
"some knowledge" to prove actual knowledge.7" This guidance is not
particularly useful as it again fails to define what will constitute knowledge.
Thus far, South Carolina, examining the knowledge element separately
from the assistance element, seems to be leaning towards the requirement of
strict actual knowledge. However, the courts have made no unequivocal
statement ofthe standard. The supreme court required actual knowledge in both
Future Group Hand Lowndes, but in neither case did the court explicitly state
actual knowledge to be a prerequisite to recovery.76 Furthermore, in Future

70. See, e.g., Kolbeck v. LIT Am., Inc., 939 F. Supp. 240, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (reciting
thatNew York common law requires actual knowledge); Diduckv. Kaszycki &Sons Contractors
Inc., 974 F.2d 270, 283 (2d Cir. 1992) (requiring only constructive knowledge) modified,
Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993); Terrydale Liquidating Trust v. Bamess, 611 F.
Supp. 1006, 1030 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (requiring actual knowledge). Mertens supplantedDiduckto
the extent that it limited plaintiff's relief to equitable remedies for claims of aiding and abetting
breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA. Mertens,508 U.S. at 262. See also Gruby v. Brady, 838
F. Supp. 820, 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). However, the standard of constructive knowledge remains
intact. See Liss v. Smith, 991 F. Supp. 278, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
71. See Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 486 (finding that defendant's knowledge of primary
wrongdoer's conduct could be inferred by the evidence presented and noting that "it defies
credulity that [defendant] Hamilton did not know that something illegal was afoot"); Kuehnle,
supranote 57, at 327-28 (noting that recklessness is the standard in the majority ofjurisdictions
for securities law violations analyzed under 876(b)).
72. See Halberstam,705 F.2d at 488 (holding that defendant could be held liable for aiding
and abetting wrongful death without proof of actual knowledge but upon showing of evidence
that would allow factfinder to infer knowledge); Aebischer v. Reidt, 704 P.2d 531,533 (Or. Ct.
App. 1985) (finding defendant liable for aiding and abetting negligence of driver because
evidence suggested that defendant should have known providing driver with marijuana would
impair his ability to drive).
73. See, e.g., Holmes v. Young, 885 P.2d 305, 310 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that the
court did not need to decide if actual or constructive knowledge was sufficient to establish
liability because both standards were supported by the evidence).
74. See Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 181
(1994).
75. Kolbeck, 939 F. Supp. at 247 (citing United States v. Giraldo, 80 F.3d 667,676 (2d Cir.

1996)).
76. See Lowndes Prod., Inc. v. Brower, 259 S.C. 322, 337, 191 S.E.2d 761, 769 (1972)
(finding, without reference to 876(b), that actual knowledge existed since defendant "knowingly
cooperated with" the primary tortfeasors, but not stating that actual knowledge was required);
Future Group, 1 v. Nationsbank, 324 S.C. 89, 99,478 S.E.2d 45, 50 (1996) (finding no liability
for defendant for aiding and abetting because of his lack of actual knowledge).
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Group II, the court hinted that constructive knowledge may suffice under
different facts." Thus, it appears that the general question of what constitutes
knowledge remains unresolved.
South Carolina should not adopt the severely limited and problematic
standard of actual knowledge.78 Defendants who turn a blind eye and assist the
obvious wrongdoings of another may not be liable. Further, an actual
knowledge requirement would wipe out the deterrent value of aiding and
abetting liability to the extent that potential aiders and abettors would have no
reason (other than moral ones) to refuse to assist primary wrongdoers whose
conduct is obviously tortious." Additionally, South Carolina should reject
actual knowledge as a standard because the courts requiring it often have to
carve out exceptions in order to compensate for its inherent unfairness.8 0
Exceptions only add to the existing complexity of the law and could have the
undesired effect of inducing innocent defendants to settle to avoid trial.8
On the other hand, a negligence standard requiring less than recklessness
or an inference of knowledge carries the risk of casting too wide a net.8"
Liability should not attach if the defendant aider and abettor merely failed to
exercise due care to the plaintiff to whom he owed no duty to exercise such
care. 3 Furthermore, a mere negligence standard could chill business

77. See FutureGroup,1, 324 S.C. at 99, 478 S.E.2d at 50 (noting that the director's breach
was not obvious since the statutory requirement for the transaction was met). Therefore, it
appears that if it had been more obvious (yet unknown to the defendant) that the primary
violator's conduct was a breach (perhaps a direct violation of a statute), constructive knowledge
may have sufficed.
78. See Kuehnle,supranote 57, at 324; Pietrusiak,supra note 57, at 236 (noting that "[t]he
elusive nature of knowledge in legal contexts further confuses the issue").
79. Additionally, an actual knowledge requirement would make proof nearly impossible
for aiding and abetting intangible torts since, short of an admission of knowledge by the
defendant, there is not likely to be any conclusive evidence of his knowledge of the wrongdoing.
See Kuehnle, supra note 57, at 322.
80. See Kuehnle, supranote 57, at 328-29. Kuehnle cites three general circumstances in
which exceptions have been made: (1) when a fiduciary or other special relationship between
plaintiff and aider and abettor exists, (2) where plaintiff has foreseeably relied on the defendant
aider and abettor, and (3) where the defendant aider and abettor receives a benefit from the
primary violator's act. The first exception seems unnecessary given that the plaintiff would not
need to rely on aider and abettor liability if the defendant had a duty directly to the plaintiff. The
usefulness of aiding and abetting liability is that it can hold a defendant liable for damages to a
plaintiff without such a duty.
81. See Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 189
(1994). While less litigation may not seem undesirable, the true effect of increased settlements
could be that professionals who provide much needed advice to businesses and individuals may
become reluctant to provide such services in the face of potential liability.
82. See Camp v. Dema, 948 F.2d 455,459 (8th Cir. 1991).
83. See McNulty & Hanson, supranote 65, at 22.
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relationships as it would require possible aiders and abettors to inquire too
deeply into the conduct of those with whom they interact."
Thus, neither actual knowledge nor failure to exercise due care as to
knowledge is an appropriate standard. Constructive knowledge, including
recklessness or inference of knowledge from the circumstances, is a reasonable
middle ground standard. Constructive knowledge does not impose liability on
professionals and others who, in the ordinary course of their business,
inadvertently assist another's wrong. At the same time, a constructive
knowledge standard would hold liable those who must have at least suspected
that the deal with which they assisted was not entirely straight.
Using circumstantial evidence to warrant an inference of knowledge is
appropriate given the impossibility, or at least extreme difficulty, in proving
actual knowledge. 85 Recklessness is an appropriate standard because it seems
only reasonable to hold aiding and abetting defendants civilly liable for conduct
that could result in a criminal conviction. 6 The criminal standard for
recklessness found in the Model Penal Code is as follows:
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material
element of an offense when he consciously disregards a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element
exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of
such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and
purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known
to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the
standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe
in the actor's situation.8
While it maybe reasonable to define knowledge as recklessness or imputed
knowledge, constructive knowledge does have its drawbacks. Given the
circumstantial and subjective nature of a constructive knowledge standard,
there will likely be further confusion about what constitutes knowledge as fact
finders reach opposite conclusions under similar fact patterns. Clearly, this
situation would be detrimental to the willingness of professionals to render
advice because it would fail to give potential defendants adequate guidance
about what may constitute aiding and abetting.

84. See Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 96 (5th Cir. 1975) (noting that
knowledge need not be actual, but to avoid overreaching, there must be some awareness of
primary wrongdoer's conduct on the part of the aider and abettor).
85. See Kuehnle, supranote 57, at 324; Pietrusiak, supra note 57, at 236.
86. See John P. Freeman & Nathan M. Crystal, Scienter in ProfessionalLiability Cases,
42 S.C. L. Rv. 783, 809 (1991) (noting that criminal liability requires recklessness, yet courts
have required even more, a "showing of'severe recklessness' or 'high conscious intent,"' from
civil defendants).
87. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(c) (1985).
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One answer to this problem is to resist bifurcation of the issues of
knowledge and assistance by employing a sliding scale test that recognizes
their interdependence. 8 The crux of this test is the evaluation of the knowledge
and assistance requirements "in tandem."89 Where assistance is not clearly
established, the plaintiffmust present more conclusive proofofknowledge, and
vice versa.* While this test originated in the well-developed context of aiding
and abetting securities law violations,9 1 courts addressing aiding and abetting
tortious conduct have made use of it.'
In the sliding scale test, the requirements are largely dependent on the facts
of each case-in particular on the "nature of [the] wrongdoing alleged."93 A
factual test such as this is appropriate given the wide variety of circumstances
under which aider and abettor liability may arise. Plaintiffs have used the
doctrine in claims for aiding and abetting, inter alia, breach of fiduciary duty,94
negligence,95 abuse of process,96 wrongful death,97 fraud,98 products liability,"
and battery.' °0

88. See Witzman v. Lehrman, Lehrman, & Flom, 601 N.W.2d 179. 188 (Minn. 1999)
(citing In re TMJ Implants Prod. Liab. Litig., 113 F.3d 1484, 1495 (8th Cir. 1997) and Camp.
v. Dema, 948 F.2d 455,459 (8th Cir. 1991)).
89. In re TMJ, 113 F.3d at 1495.
90. See Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779, 784 (8th Cir. 1981).
91. The standards for aiding and abetting federal securities law violations were largely
taken from Restatement (Second) of Torts section 876(b) (1979). See McNulty &Hanson, supra
note 64, at 23.
92. See In re TMJ, 113 F.3d at 1495; Witzman, 601 N.W.2d at 188. See also Halberstam
v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 478 & n.8, 487-88 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (applying a similar approach
without explicitly calling it a sliding scale). In Woodwardv. Metro Bank ofDallas,522 F.2d 84,
97 (5th Cir. 1975), the court altered the test to find that general awareness sufficed but required
that the assistance be knowing. Obviously, if the assistance is knowing, the defendant knows of
the breach.
93. Terrydale Liquidating Trust v. Bamess, 611 F. Supp. 1006, 1030 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
94. See Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. United Am. Bank ofMemphis 21 F. Supp.2d 785 (W.D.
Tenn. 1998); Kolbeck v. LIT Am., Inc., 939 F. Supp. 240, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Diduck v.
Kaszycki & Sons Contractors, Inc., 974 F.2d 270 (2d Cir. 1992); S & K Sales Co. v. Nike, Inc.,
816 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1987); Holmes v. Young, 885 P.2d 305 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994); Ezzone v.
Riccardi, 525 N.W.2d388 (Iowa 1994); Witzman, 601 N.W.2d at 185; Blowv. Shaughnessy, 364
S.E.2d 444 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988); Granewichv. Harding, 985 P.2d 788 (Or. 1999); Future Group,
If v. Nationsbank, 324 S.C. 89, 478 S.E.2d 45 (1996).
95. See Aebischer v. Reidt, 704 P.2d 531 (Or. Ct. App. 1985); Pruitt v. Bowers, 330 S.C
483, 499 S.E.2d 250 (Ct. App. 1998).
96. See Broadmoor Apartments of Charleston v. Horwitz, 306 S.C. 482, 413 S.E.2d 9
(1991).
97. See Halberstam,705 F.2d at 472; Hough v. Hough, No. 25145, 1999 WL 412358 (W.
Va. June 18, 1999).
98. See Department of Econ. Dev. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 924 F. Supp. 449, 455
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); In re Consolidated Welfare Fund ERISA Litig., 856 F. Supp. 837 (S.D.N.Y.
1994); Curiale v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 630 N.Y.S.2d 996 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).
99. See In re TMJ Implants Prod. Liab. Litig., 113 F.3d 1484, 1495 (8th Cir. 1997).
100. See Courtney v. Courtney, 413 S.E.2d 418 (W. Va. 1991).
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2. The SubstantialAssistanceRequirement: How Much is Enough?
Before a full evaluation of the sliding scale approach can be made, it is
necessary to address the remaining factor-substantial assistance. While
knowledge is difficult to define, the substantial assistance element is even less
settled.' The uncertainty about substantial assistance has been exacerbated by
courts attempting to treat knowledge and assistance separately.
Substantial assistance is basically a requirement of proximate cause. The
comment to 876(b) states, "[i]fthe encouragement or assistance is a substantial
factor in causing the resulting tort, the one giving it is himself a tortfeasor and
is responsible for the consequences of the other's act."' 2
This interpretation is obvious, yet necessary, especially in light ofthe fact
that the aider and abettor need not intend harm to the plaintiff."3 Negligent acts
by the primary tortfeasor should not make another party whose alleged aid or
encouragement was not a significant factor in the resulting harm liable.
Although not specifically addressing 876(b), the South Carolina Supreme Court
has required a similar element of proximate cause for aiding and abetting
liability. In Lowndes Products,Inc. v. Brower the supreme court noted that
without the defendant aider and abettor's help, the plaintiffmay not have been
harmed.'"
While it is clear that proximate cause should be an element in any test for
substantial assistance, that concept does not adequately define those acts of
assistance or encouragement which trigger liability. Specifically, the concept
does not address whether silence or inaction can be grounds for aider and
abettor liability.
Some courts and commentators object to imposing aiding and abetting
liability for silence or inaction where the defendant owes no duty to the
plaintiff0 5 Two main reasons for this "deep-seated antipathy" to "liability for

101. See Halberstam,705 F.2d at 481; McNulty & Hanson, supranote 65, at 19. But see
Kuehnle, supra note 57, at 322 (arguing that the most difficult element to define is knowledge).
102. RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS § 876 cmt. d (1979);see, e.g., Kolbeck v. LITAm.,
Inc., 939 F. Supp. 240, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (requiring that defendant's inaction must be
proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries); Blow v. Shaughnessy, 364 S.E.2d 444, 447 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1988) (stating "[f]ederal courts have construed the 'substantial assistance' requirement of
aiding and abetting as a causation requirement").
103. See Diduck v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors, Inc., 974 F.2d 270,282 (2d Cir. 1992)
(applying no intent to harm necessary rule from S & KSales Co. v. Nike, Inc., 816 F.2d 843 (2d
Cir. 1987)); S & K Sales, 816 F.2d at 849 (stating bluntly that "the tort of participation in a
fiduciary's breach of duty simply does not require proof of an intent to harm"). See also
RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 876 cmt. d (1979) (noting that liability attaches for
intentional harms as well as merely negligent acts).
104. 259 S.C. 322, 337, 191 S.E.2d 761, 769 (1972).
105. See Kolbeck, 939 F. Supp. at 247; First Fin. Say. Bank v. Am. Bankers Ins., 696 FED.
SEC. L. REP. 95 (E.D.N.C., July 5, 1990); McNulty & Hanson, supra note 65, at 17-21 (arguing
that liability for inaction or silence should be replaced by liability if the defendant breaches a
duty to disclose and noting that there is generally no duty for someone to act to protect another
from harm).
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mere inaction" have been advanced by commentators: (1) the highly
individualistic nature of the common law (for example, there is no duty for the
person sitting on the dock to rescue the man drowning in front of him), and (2)
the reluctance of courts to force people to be good samaritans.'
Courts have imposed liability absent a duty when the assistance provided
was inaction, but in doing so the courts have generally required conscious
intent to aid the wrongful act. 7 Thus, conscious intent can be viewed as an
exception to the general rule that silence and inaction are not actionable.
However, as with the exceptions created to avoid the harshness of the
knowledge requirement, this exception would be easier to apply and more
flexible if expressed as an element of the sliding scale approach. In other
words, the level of assistance required should depend on the knowledge of the
defendant.
The interplay between knowledge and assistance still does not provide
much guidance as to what constitutes substantial assistance. In fact, using
interdependence alone would simply create a circular test under which the court
would say that knowledge depends on assistance and assistance depends on
knowledge. No useful test would result.
Fortunately, courts have adopted a number of factors to address the
substantial assistance element." 8 The comment to 876(b) sets forth five factors:
"the nature of the act encouraged, the amount of assistance given by the
defendant, his presence or absence at the time of the tort, his relation to the
other and his state of mind."'" Courts have identified an additional factor for
judging the substantiality of the assistance: duration of the assistance
provided."0
The factors set forth above, when applied under the sliding scale approach,
help to address the problems of liability for inaction and silence and the
definition of the requisite knowledge. Again, the usefulness of fact-specific
factors is clear considering the wide variety of instances in which aider and
abettor liability can arise."'
The nature of the act factor helps to define the knowledge factor.
Knowledge is easier to prove for physical torts than for non-physical torts."'
Compare the defendant who aids and abets an assault by yelling "Kill him!"
106. See McNulty & Hanson, supra note 65, at 21.
107. See Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 625 (8th Cir. 1985); Halberstam v. Welch, 705
F.2d 472,485 & n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1983). See generallyWoodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522
F.2d 84,96-97 (5th Cir. 1975) (providing a general background on the state ofthe law of liability
for inaction and silence).
108. See In re TMJ Implants Prod. Liab. Litig., 113 F.3d 1484, 1495 (8th Cir. 1997);
Halberstanz,705 F.2d at 483-84; Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. United Am. Bank of Memphis, 21
F. Supp.2d 785,798-99 (W.D. Tenn. 1998); Courtney v. Courtney, 413 S.E.2d 418,426 (V. Va.
1991).

109.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §

876 cmt. d (1979).

110. See Halberstam,705 F.2d at 484 cited with approval in In re TMJ, 113 F.3d at 1495.
111. See supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
112. See Kuehnle, supra note 57, at 322.
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and "Hit him more!l 13 to the lawyer who drafts papers for his corporate client
which are in breach of a duty to the client's fiduciary."' Obviously, in the
former example, the nature ofthe act makes knowledge easy to establish while,
in the latter example, the plaintiff may need a considerable amount of
circumstantial evidence to prove knowledge.
The amount of assistance factor is interwoven with the knowledge
requirement as well. The greater the amount of assistance, the more easily
knowledge can be inferred. Likewise, if there is not evidence of actual
knowledge and the assistance was minimal (as it may be if the defendant aided
and abetted by participation in routine business activities), then there is likely
no basis for imputing knowledge."'
The third factor also relates to the defendant's knowledge. Presence at the
time of the tort can be evidence that the defendant knew of the breach.
However, more knowledge may be required the further removed from the tort
the defendant is in time and distance." 6 ConsiderRussellv. MarlboroBooks,""
in which the court found substantial assistance based on the defendant seller's
knowledge that the buyer of a model's picture intended to alter the picture and
use it to defame the model."' Substantial
assistance existed because of the
9
defendant's high level of knowledge"
The defendant's relation to the primary wrongdoer may also be evidence
that could overcome a lack of actual knowledge. For example, in Halberstam
v. Welch, the defendant's relation to the primary wrongdoer furthered the
inference that she knew of the wrongdoings of her live-in companion. 2 '
However, this factor has more often been used to show that the defendant's
conduct constituted substantial assistance because he held a position of

113. See Rael v. Cadena, 604 P.2d 822,823 (N.M. CL App. 1979) (finding defendant who
did not physically participate but cheered on the assault liable for aiding and abetting).
114. See Kuehnle, supra note 57, at 322.
115. See Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 95 (5th Cir. 1975). See also
Camp v. Dema, 948 F.2d 455, 459 (8th Cir. 1991) ("Knowingly engaging in a customary
business transaction which incidentally aids the violation of securities laws, without more, will
not lead to liability."); Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621,625 (8th Cir. 1985) (stating that liability
based on inaction would require greater showing ofintent); Spinner v. Nutt, 631 N.E.2d 542,546
(Mass. 1994) (noting that giving legal advice, "without more, is insufficient to give rise to a
claim that an attorney is responsible to third persons for the fraudulent acts of his clients");
Witzman v. Lehrman, Lehrman & Flom, 601 N.W.2d 179, 187 (Minn. 1999) (noting that where
breach to which assistance is given is not obvious, courts are reluctant to impose liability without
proof of actual knowledge and indicating the court's intention, with respect to professionals, to
apply the requirements strictly).
116. See Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472,488 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
117. 18 Misc. 2d 166 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959).
118. Id. at 188.
119. See idat 187-88 (finding that defendant rendered substantial assistance since the libel
was not only foreseeable to defendant but also known to the defendant).
120. See Halberstam,705 F.2d at 488.
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authority in relation to the primary wrongdoer. 2 ' In these cases,
the aiding and
1
abetting typically takes the form of active encouragement. 2
The fifth factor is the defendant's state of mind. As stated earlier, a strong
showing of intent on the part of the defendant will overcome lack of proof of
actual knowledge." The potential benefit to the defendant is also relevant in
assessing his state of mind." Where the defendant stands to gain from the
other's wrongful conduct, it may be easier to assume the requisite knowledge
existed."z Thus, even if he did little to actually aid the other's tort, he may be
held to have provided enough assistance because his acquiescence in the
conduct that benefitted him indicates actual knowledge.
Adding the sixth factor of duration of the assistance, the court in
Halberstamseemed to be merely expanding a discussion of two other factors:
the defendant's relation to the wrongdoer and the defendant's state of mind.
The court stated that "[tihe length of time an alleged aider-abettor has been
involved with atortfeasor almost certainly affects the quality and extent of their
relationship and probably influences the amount of aid provided as126well;
additionally, it may afford evidence of the defendant's state of mind."'
It probably makes little difference whether the duration of assistance is
treated as a separate factor or is viewed as a subset of the factors examining the
defendant's state of mind and relation to the wrongdoer. The key point of the
substantial assistance analysis as an element of the sliding scale approach is
that it is fact-specific and provides general guidelines for imposing liability on
alleged aiders and abettors.
IV. THE FUTURE OF 876(b) INSOUTH CAROLINA
A. Choosinga Test

121. See Cobb v. Indian Springs, Inc., 522 S.W.2d 383, 387 (Ark. 1975) (finding that
security guard's encouragement of boy to test the speed of his car was substantial assistance
given his position of authority).
122. See id.
123. See, e.g., Russell, 18 Misc. 2d at 188 (implying that defendant intended to assist in
the defamation).
124. See S & K Sales Co. v. Nike, Inc., 816 F.2d 843, 849 (2d Cir. 1987) (refusing to find
erroneous ajury charge that indicated that defendant could be liable if it knowingly accepted the
benefits of the breach).
125. See, e.g., Halberstam,705 F.2d at 488 (noting that defendant enjoyed the fruits ofher
live-in companion's nightly burglaries); Broadmoor Apartments of Charleston v. Horwitz, 306
S.C. 482, 487, 413 S.E.2d 9, 12 (1991) (finding that defendant stood to benefit from aiding and
abetting the abuse ofprocess by virtue of a ten percent interest under an assignment); Lowndes
Prod. Inc. v. Brower, 259 S.C. 322, 337-38, 191 S.E.2d 761, 769-70 (1972) (finding that the
defendant aider and abettor had not only assisted but also bad profited from the primary
wrongdoers' breach and thus should be liable for damages caused by that breach).
126. Halberstam,705 F.2d at 484.
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The elements involved in an aiding and abetting tortious conduct claim
have appeared in cases in this country for many years, sometimes specifically
applying 876(b), other times without reference to either the first or second
Restatement. However, as noted earlier, courts have not been particularly
consistent in applying these elements. This Comment, therefore, does not
purport to advance a new test, but rather attempts to synthesize the tests
employed by different courts into a workable approach that can be used when
analyzing any claim of aiding and abetting tortious conduct.
The sliding scale analysis advanced here is hardly new either. The Fifth
Circuit first articulated this approach in 1975 when it used 876(b) to define the
elements of aiding and abetting a federal securities law violation. 27 Since then,
other courts have used it as an explicit test in aiding and abetting tortious
conduct claims.128
In deciding whether to adopt 876(b), and, if so, how to adopt it, South
Carolina courts should give serious consideration to the sliding scale approach.
The primary benefit of this approach is the flexibility it allows while still
providing guidance as to when liability should attach. A strict rule requiring
actual knowledge and barring liability in cases of inaction and silence would
inevitably be problematic, as demonstrated by the experience of other courts
which have been forced to make exceptions to their stringent rules in order to
prevent injustice.
Of course, South Carolina could choose not to articulate any standards for
876(b) liability and, instead, follow a case-by-case approach. However, there
is great danger in that path since businesspeople, attorneys, accountants, and
other professionals would not be able to judge their potential liability absent
case law directly on point. As the Supreme Court has noted, such uncertainty
has a detrimental effect on the provision of professional services which can, in
turn, create a ripple effect hindering newer and smaller companies that need
such advice."Z
Therefore, South Carolina should embrace 876(b) and set out a test that
uses the sliding scale approach. The analysis consists of three basic elements:
(1) the primary wrongdoer's tortious conduct causes injury to the plaintiff; (2)
the aider and abettor has acted recklessly with respect to knowledge of the
conduct or his knowledge can be inferred by the circumstances; and (3) the
aider and abettor substantially assists or encourages the wrongdoer in the
breach. The knowledge and assistance requirements are evaluated in tandem.
The aider and abettor is then liable for all foreseeable injuries flowing from the
conduct of the primary wrongdoer, regardless of whether he only specifically

127. See Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 97 (5th Cir. 1975).
128. See In re TMJ Implants Prod. Liab. Litig., 113 F.3d 1484, 1495 (8th Cir. 1997);
Witzman v. Lehrman, Lehrman & Floram, 601 N.W.2d 179, 188 (Minn. 1999).
129. See Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 188
(1994).
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aided and abetted part of the conduct. The aiding and abetting need only be a
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.
B. OtherApplications
While it is easy to see that the approach advocated above could readily be
applied to cases like the aiding and abetting negligence claim involved inPruitt
v. Bowers,3 ' there are many other instances in which liability for aiding and
abetting could arise. In all instances, the purposes of aider and abettor liability
should be clear: (1) fuller compensation
for victims; and (2) deterrence of
3
participation in wrongful activities. 1
Inline with these purposes, the doctrine would be useful for supplementing
a plaintiff's recovery in securities fraud, as the plaintiff could sue responsible
parties for aiding and abetting common law fraud. Claims by defrauded
investors would be especially relevant now that both the United States Supreme
Court and the South Carolina Supreme Court have effectively closed the door
on plaintiffs' implied private32rights of action for aiding and abetting statutory
violations of securities law.
Additionally, aider and abettor liability may serve to increase deterrence
of drunk driving. As the law stands now, friends drinking with drivers have
nothing more than a moral incentive to take the keys away from someone
clearly too drunk to drive. Imposing liability on one who substantially aids and
abets such negligent conduct of another could help to curb drunk
driving and
133
diminish the economic impact such conduct has on the state.
V. CONCLUSION

130. 330 S.C. 483, 499 S.E.2d 250 (Ct. App. 1998) (allowing plaintiff, who was injured
in a car wreck, to go forward with aiding and abetting cause of action against passenger in car
driven by drunk driver).
131. See CentralBank, 511 U.S. at 188.
132. See id. at 191 (holding that no private right of action exists for aiding and abetting
suits under § 10(b) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934,15 U.S.C. § 78j (1981)); Atlanta Skin
& Cancer Clinic v. Hallmark Gen. Partners, Inc., 320 S.C. 113, 121,463 S.E.2d 600, 605 (1995)
(holding that no implied right of action exists "for aiding and abetting a Securities Act violation
outside of the express remedy contained in § 35-1-1500"). This section of the statute limits
liability to "(1) a partner, officer, or director of a seller (or person occupying a similar status or
performing similar functions), (2) an employee of a seller, (3) a broker-dealer, and (4) an agent."
S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-1500 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1999).
133. In 1998, 220 (24%) of the 912 fatal crashes in South Carolina were alcohol-related.
Nearly 10% of those killed on South Carolina's roads were involved in an alcohol-related
accident. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (visited Jan. 28, 2000)
<http://www.fars.nhtsa.dot.gov>. On a national level, direct costs of alcohol-related crashes are
estimated to be $44 billion yearly, including $6 billion in direct medical costs. An additional $90
billion is lost in quality of life due to these crashes. Mothers Against Drunk Driving, Crash
Costs, (visited Jan. 28, 2000) <http://www.madd.org/stats>.
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With only a little imagination, practitioners could find numerous other
ways in which aider and abettor liability could serve to further the goals of the
state's judicial system. Aider and abettor liability under 876(b), tested with a
sliding scale approach, could certainly advance these policies. Adopting the
sliding scale standard and the factors identified in the comment to 876(b) can
avoid the confusing and uncertain case law that has marked jurisprudence in
this area. As aider and abettor liability law progresses in this state, the courts
can further refine the elements and add factors that best suit the state's needs.
Josephine T. Willis
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